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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, an intense economic and ideological
controversy has developed regarding the appropriate legal regime for
deep seabed mining. The apparently accessible abundance of ferro
manganese nodules1 on the ocean floor has triggered hopes that the
seabed will one day be an important source of the world's minerals.2
The minerals contained in the seabed represent a potentially crucial
opportunity for the industrialized nations to decrease their dependence
on land-based mines in the Third World.3 As interest in the potential
of seabed mining grew, the dearth of international guidelines gov-
erning such mining became increasingly apparent.
Recognizing the growing need for a comprehensive multilateral
ocean law regime, a significant majority of nations signed the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the "Convention") in
1982.4 The United States, however, chose not to sign the Convention.
Instead, the United States, together with seven other Western industri-
alized countries,5 entered into the Provisional Understanding Regard-
ing Deep Seabed Matters (the "Provisional Understanding"). 6 By
signing the Provisional Understanding, the United States sacrificed the
advantageous mining opportunities and global stability offered by the
1. "The nodules consist of rounded blackish aggregations of hydrated oxides of iron
and manganese, as well as smaller amounts of cobalt, copper, and nickel." Collins, Mineral
Exploitation of the Seabed: Problems, Progress, and Alternatives, 12 NAT. RESOURCES L.
599, 605 (1979). They are generally one to twenty centimeters in diameter, round or oval
shaped, and lie on the seabed surface or are partially embedded in subsea mud. Id.
2. "Interest in nodules peaked in the mid-1970s, with international consortiums pre-
paring for mining, commercial operations predicted by the mid-1980s, and literally
thousands of reports and reviews circulating in scientific, trade, and popular media." Man-
heim, Marine Cobalt Resources, 232 Sci. 600, 600 (1986). By the early 1980s, however, in
the face of weak metal markets and the political uncertainties caused by the U.S. decision
not to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, see infra note 4, pros-
pects for commercial seabed mining receded, and "nodule mining consortiums reduced
operations to skeletal levels or disbanded them altogether." Manheim, supra, at 600.
3. See Collins, supra note I, at 611. For example,
Of the minerals contained in the nodules, the United States presently imports 99
percent of its manganese, 91 percent of its nickel, 98 percent of its cobalt, and 18
percent of its copper needs.... The United States imports manganese from Brazil,
Gabon, Zaire, France and India; cobalt from Zaire; and copper from Chile, Peru,
and Canada. Of these sources, only Canada and France might qualify as a 'secure'
one [sic].
Id. Western Europe and Japan are similarly dependent. Id.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
Convention].
5. The parties to the Provisional Understanding are Belgium, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
6. Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters, Aug. 3, 1984,
U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. No. _, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1354 (1984) [hereinafter
Provisional Understanding].
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Convention in exchange for the Provisional Understanding's ideologi-
cal purity. Notwithstanding its ostensive compatibility with free mar-
ket ideals, the Provisional Understanding is far less favorable to long-
term U.S. interests in deep seabed mining than a universally recog-
nized regime such as that established by the Convention.
An overview of the seabed mining controversy is presented in
Part I of this Note; the Convention's deep seabed mining regime is
outlined in Part II; U.S. objections to the Convention are detailed in
Part III; and a response to those objections is offered in Part IV. The
Provisional Understanding's seabed mining regime is described in Part
V; and the agreement's shortcomings are analyzed in Part VI, as are
the current status of the United States with regard to seabed mining,
and its future prospects in the area.
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS III") devoted nearly a decade to drafting a comprehen-
sive convention to govern virtually all aspects of ocean law.7 The Con-
vention was overwhelmingly adopted in New York on April 30, 1982
by a vote of 130 to 4, with 17 abstentions.8 On July 9, 1982, however,
in an abrupt change in U.S. ocean policy,9 President Reagan
announced that the United States would not sign the Convention. 10
The Administration's objections to the Convention focused almost
exclusively on the agreement's seabed mining provisions. I I Specifi-
cally, the United States objected to the provisions of the Convention
7. Katz, A Method for Evaluating the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the Law of the
Sea Treaty, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 114, 114 (1980); Pardo, The Convention on the
Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Appraisal, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 489, 489 (1983).
8. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Law of the Sea Conference, Eleventh Session,
U.N. Press Release SEA/494, at 10 (Apr. 30, 1982). The Convention was rejected by
Israel, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela. The countries abstaining included
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, together with the Eastern European
countries, except Romania. On December 10, 1982, 117 countries and a U.N. body repre-
senting Nambia and the Cook Islands signed the treaty; 23 countries, including the United
States, attended the signing ceremony in Jamaica but did not sign; and 24 countries did not
attend the ceremony. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1982, at Al, col. 2.
9. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1981, at Al, col. 1; see also infra note 18.
10. Richardson, The United States Posture Toward the Law of the Sea Convention:
Awkward but not Irreparable, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 505, 505 (1983).
11. See Statement on United States Actions Concerning the Conference on the Law of
the Sea, July 9, 1982, 2 PUB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN 911, 911 (1982); Statement on
United States Participation in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Jan. 29, 1982, 1 PUB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN 92, 92 (1982) ("Our review has con-
cluded that while most provisions of the draft Convention are acceptable and consistent
with United States interests, some major elements of the deep seabed mining regime are not
acceptable."); see also Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L
L. 785, 788 (1984).
1987]
226 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
applying the "common heritage of mankind" doctrine to seabed
resources, 12 an approach that the Reagan administration viewed as
inimical to U.S. geopolitical and economic interests and free market
ideology.
The Administration's objections to the Convention were both
practical and ideological.13 Critics of the current U.S. position, how-
ever, have argued that the Convention regime adequately addresses
many of the Administration's practical concerns, and will allow the
initiation and stabilization of profitable seabed mining.14 Further-
more, these critics contend that all the parties involved must make
ideological compromises in creating wholly new guidelines for cooper-
ative conduct by over 150 nations. 15
Nevertheless, with the apparent failure of the Convention, the
United States and seven like-minded industrialized nations sought an
international regime that would lend stability to their seabed mining
activities. Frustrated by Convention provisions which they believed
unfairly and unnecessarily granted a disproportionate voice to devel-
oping countries that have little or no investment in seabed mining
operations, these eight nations sought a seabed mining regime more
wholly in keeping with their economic interests. The Provisional
Understanding parties desired an agreement that would minimize
bureaucratic interference by Third World countries hoping to share
the profits but not the risks of seabed mining operations. The parties
drafted a streamlined treaty that imposed upon each signatory an obli-
gation of noninterference with each party's seabed activities. The Pro-
visional Understanding is devoid of any provision calling for an
international governing body and rejects any attempt to encourage
Third World involvement in seabed mining.
B. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SEABED MINING ON DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Currently, the industrialized countries consume large quantities
of the minerals found on the seabed; these minerals are obtained pri-
12. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
13. Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475, 477-86
(1982).
14. See, e.g., Richardson, Superpowers Need Law: A Response to the United States
Rejection of the Law of the Sea Treaty, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1982) (the
author, Former United States Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the Pres-
ident to the Law of the Sea Conference, headed the U.S. delegation to the Law of the Sea
Conference from February 1977 to October 1980). "[T]here is no serious prospect that the
objectionable features will be involved." Id. at 10; see also infra text accompanying notes
133-54.
15. See Richardson, supra note 14.
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madly from land-based mining operations in developing nations. 16
Profitable seabed mining would give the industrialized West greater
economic and political flexibility by reducing its dependence on terres-
trial mines in the Third World. Successful seabed mining will further
advance the interests of consuming countries by increasing the supply
of minerals and lowering their prices.
Any gains by consuming countries, however, will be accompanied
by relatively greater losses to the Third World's land-based producers.
Seabed mining by the developed countries not only will increase the
supply of minerals and thus reduce their prices, but also will redirect
Western investments theretofore earmarked to expand the production
capacity of terrestrial mines. The potential impact of seabed mining
on developed and developing nations causes the often bitter debate
regarding the appropriate legal regime to govern seabed mining.
C. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE APPLICABLE TO THE SEABED:
FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS OR THE COMMON
HERITAGE OF MANKIND?
The polarization of this controversy is reflected in the disagree-
ment over the appropriate legal doctrine to govern seabed mining
activity: "freedom of the high seas" or "the common heritage of man-
kind." 17 The United States and a few other Western nations believe
that the "freedom of the high seas" doctrine should govern the sea-
bed.' 8 This doctrine, based on the principle of res nullius,19 states that
although no nation owns the seabed, it is susceptible to appropria-
16. See supra note 3.
17. See, eg., Mashayekhi, The Present Legal Status of Deep Seabed Mining, 19 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 229 (1985); Van Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the
High Seas" Which Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 493 (1982).
18. The Reagan Adminstration's unequivocal position regarding the applicability of
the freedom of high seas principle to the seabed has not always been the official U.S. posi-
tion. President Johnson first put forth the U.S. position in an oft-quoted speech delivered
in 1966: "We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the high
seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy
of all human beings." Remarks at the Commissioning of the Research Ship Oceanographer,
July 13, 1966, 2 PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 722, 724 (1966); see also Richardson,
Law in the Making: A Universal Regime for Deep Seabed Mining?, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 408,
410 & n.3 (1981). Within three years, the world community had accepted the common
heritage concept. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749
(XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (approved by a
vote of 108 to 0). "The sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction... as well as the resources of the area, are the common
heritage of mankind." Id. Likewise, President Nixon seemed to have embraced the com-
mon heritage notion. In a speech renouncing all sovereign rights to the seabed and its
resources and announcing the U.S. policy of helping to establish an international machin-
ery to administer the licensing of seabed exploration and exploitation, President Nixon
stated: "The international seabed would be the common heritage of mankind and no state
could exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over this area or its resources." Nelson,
1987]
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tion.20 Traditionally, the "freedom of the high seas" doctrine has gov-
erned, inter alia, fishing and navigation.
The great majority of nations and many Western commentators,
however, contend that the "common heritage of mankind" concept,
not the "freedom of the high seas" doctrine should govern the seabed.
Based on the principle of res communes,21 this doctrine provides the
foundation for the argument that extra-jurisdictional seabed resources
should be apportioned only according to rules that ensure exploitation
of the seabed in the common interest of all nations. 22 There are four
generally recognized elements of the common heritage doctrine: first,
no nation can apportion the area to which the doctrine applies; sec-
ond, all countries must share in the area's management; third, all
countries must actively share in the benefits derived from the area's
resources; and fourth, the area must be reserved for peaceful pur-
poses.23 Proponents of the common heritage doctrine note that seabed
mining, unlike fishing or navigation, can occur only when each miner
has exclusive rights to a specific area. In seabed mining, the mining
sites cannot overlap; therefore, contrary to the principle of res nullius,
nations must exclude each other in order to mine the seabed. 24
Thus, there is presently no consensus as to the appropriate doc-
trine to govern the seabed. Beyond the impediments it creates to for-
mulating a treaty acceptable to all parties, the "which doctrine"
debate alone has little practical impact on the attractiveness or availa-
bility of investment in seabed mining. Universal agreement on the
"freedom of the high seas" principle simply would encourage each
mining enterprise to rush to claim specific mining areas. Such a situa-
tion, however, would be too uncertain for investors to risk billions of
dollars on projects having no assurance of uninterrupted mining
rights. 25 Under a "freedom of the high seas" regime, hesitancy by
investors is particularly likely given the uncertain outcome of any
International Court of Justice decision on the legality of seabed mining
C6ntemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 179, 180 (1971).
19. "The property of nobody." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979).
20. See Larschan & Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in Interna-
tional Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 312 (1983).
21. "[T]hings common to all; that is, those things which are used and enjoyed by every-
one, even in single parts, but can never be exclusively acquired as a whole, e.g., light and
air." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979).
22. See Larschan & Brennan, supra note 20.
23. Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the
Rules of International Space Law, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 219 (1981).
24. See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 17, at 509-11.
25. Biblowit, Deep Seabed Mining: The United States and the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 367, 377 (1984); Molitor, The U.S, Deep
Seabed Mining Regulations: The Legal Basis for an Alternative Regime, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 599, 601 (1981); Richardson, supra note 10, at 509.
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outside of the Convention. 26 Notwithstanding the Convention's adop-
tion of the "common heritage of mankind" doctrine, the United States
should sacrifice its rigid ideological requirements and accept the
potential benefits of the Convention to avoid the chilling effect on
investment of rejecting the Convention and supporting the "freedom
of the high seas" doctrine.
II. THE CONVENTION'S DEEP SEABED MINING REGIME
A. SCOPE, ADMINSTRATION, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Part XI of the Convention, 27 which addresses seabed mining, gov-
erns "activities in the Area."'28 The Convention defines the "Area" as
"the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. '29 Part XI covers "all activities of exploration
for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area."
'30
Section 4 of Part X131 creates "the Authority," an international
administrative organization to govern activities in the Area.32 The
Authority is based on the sovereign equality of all its members. 33 The
Authority's principle organs are an Assembly, a Council, and a Secre-
tariat.34 In addition, the Authority is empowered to establish "the
Enterprise," an international business organization with the authority
to engage in activities in the Area, concurrently with state and private
operators, 35 pursuant to the Convention's "parallel system."1
36
Section 2 of Part X137 delineates a number of principles governing
the Area. The Convention adopts the "common heritage of mankind"
doctrine with regard to "the Area and its resources."' 38 Section 2 also
prohibits any activities in the Area not conducted pursuant to the
Convention, and voids all claims of title to minerals recovered, except
minerals recovered in accordance with the Convention. 39 Activities in
the Area conducted under unilateral domestic legislation4 authorizing
26. See infra text accompanying notes 165-68.
27. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 133-191.
28. Id. art. 134, para. 2.
29. Id. art. 1, para. 1(1).
30. Id. art. 1, para. 1(3).
31. Id. arts. 156-191.
32. Id. arts. 156-158.
33. Id. art. 157, para. 3.
34. Id. art. 158, para. 1.
35. Id. art. 158, para. 2; art. 170, para. 1.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 68-83.
37. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 136-149.
38. Id. art. 130.
39. Id. arts. 137-138.
40. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1473 (1980) (USA); Exploration and the Exploitation of the Mineral Resources of the Deep
Sea-bed, Law No. 81-1135 of 23 Dec. 1981, 1981 J.O. 3499-500, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 808
(1982) (France); Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining 1980 BGBI.I 1457,
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development outside of the Convention would therefore appear to vio-
late Section 2.41
The remaining articles of the Section outline various additional
principles. Such principles include a declaration that activities in the
Area shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole4 2 and
provide for an equitable sharing of economic benefits derived from the
Area.43 Other articles dictate that the Area be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes,44 and provide for scientific research, 45 the transfer
of technology,46 and the protection of the marine environment, 47 and
human life.48 Furthermore, the Convention requires that any activi-
ties in the Area must accomodate other activities in the marine envi-
ronment,49 that the developing states participate in seabed mining,50
and that archaeological and historical objects found in the Area be
preserved.5 1
B. GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA
Section 3 of Part X15 2 enumerates several policies and restrictions
relating to development of the Area's resources. Article 150 sets out
ten policies relating to Area development.53 The apparent conflicts
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 393 (1981) and Act to Amend the Interim Regulation of Deep Sea-
bed Mining, 1982 BGBI.I, 136, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 832 (1982) (Federal Republic of
Germany); Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1981, ch. 53, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 1217 (1981) (United Kingdom); Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining
[enacted July 20, 1982], reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 102 (1983) (Japan); Edict on Provisional
Measures To Regulate Enterprises For The Exploration And Exploitation Of Mineral
Resources, Ved. Verkh Soy. RSFSR, Apr. 18, 1982, Izvestia, Apr. 1982, at 1, reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 551 (1982) (USSR).
41. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
42. Convention, supra note 4, art. 140, para. 1.
43. Id. art. 140, para. 2.
44. Id. art. 141.
45. Id. art. 143.
46. Id. art. 144.
47. Id. art. 145.
48. Id. art. 146.
49. Id. art. 147.
50. Id. art. 148.
51. Id. art. 149.
52. Id. arts. 150-155.
53. Id. art. 150. Article 150 provides:
Activities in the Area shall.., be carried out in such a manner as to foster healthy
development of the world economy and balanced growth of international trade,
and to promote international co-operation for the over-all development of all coun-
tries, especially developing states, and with a view to ensuring:
(a) the development of the resources of the Area;
(b) orderly, safe and rational management of the resources of the Area, including
the efficient conduct of activities in the Area and, in accordance with sound princi-
ples of conservation, the avoidance of unnecessary waste;
(c) the expansion of opportunities for participation in such activities consistent in
particular with articles 144 [transfer of technology] and 148 [participation of the
developing states in activities in the Area];
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among these policies reflect the divergent goals of the UNCLOS III
participants. For example, the first goal, "the development of the
resources of the Area,"'54 may seem to conflict with the goal of protect-
ing developing countries from adverse economic effects that result
from Area development.5 5 Such ostensibly contradictory objectives
are not fatal flaws. Rather, they represent attempts by the UNCLOS
III participants to at least recognize, if not reconcile, their various
competing interests and goals.
Article 151 establishes rules that the United States considers par-
ticularly objectionable. It provides a twenty-five year interim period
during which commercial production of Area resources shall not
occur unless the Authority issues a production authorization to the
operator.56 In addition, Article 151 establishes a formula setting pro-
duction ceilings for each year of the interim period.57
Theoretically, such provisions are incompatible with free market
ideology. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these provisions will ever
obstruct commercial seabed development by Western consortia.5 8 The
high level of the production ceiling all but precludes any possibility of
(d) participation in revenues by the Authority and the transfer of technology to
the Enterprise and developing States as provided for in this Convention;
(e) increased availability of minerals derived from the Area as needed in conjunc-
tion with minerals derived from other sources, to ensure supplies to consumers of
such minerals;
(f) the promotion of just and stable prices remunerative to producers and fair to
consumers for minerals derived both from the Area and from other sources, and
the promotion of long-term equilibrium between supply and demand;
(g) the enhancement of opportunities for all States Parties, irrespective of their
social and economic systems or geographical location, to participate in the devel-
opment of the resources of the Area and the prevention of monopolization of activ-
ities in the Area;
(h) the protection of developing countries from adverse effects on their economies
or on their export earnings resulting from a reduction in the price of an affected
mineral, or in the volume of the exports of that mineral, to the extent that such
reduction is caused by activities in the Area, as provided in article 151 [production
policies];
(i) the development of the common heritage for the benefit of mankind as a
whole; and
(j) conditions of access to markets for the imports of minerals produced from the
resources of the Area and for imports of commodities produced from such miner-
als shall not be more favourable than the most favourable applied to imports from
other sources.
54. Id. art. 150(a).
55. Id. art. 150(h).
56. Id. art. 151, paras. 2-3.
57. Id. art. 151, paras. 3-4. The production limitation will necessarily be in effect only
fifteen years. See Richardson, supra note 18, at 444 n.21; see also infra note 132.
58. See Antrim & Sebenius, Incentives for Ocean Mining Under the Convention, in LAW
OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 79, 91-92 (1983) [hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA];
Bailey, The Future of the Exploitation of the Resources of the Deep Seabed and Subsoil, 46:2
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 71, 74 (1983); Richardson, supra note 18, at 444; Richardson,
supra note 14, at 10-12; see also infra text accompanying notes 126-41.
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restricting development 9 Similarly, the technology transfer provi-
sion60 will probably never be invoked because it requires the Authority
to find that the Enterprise cannot purchase needed technology on the
open market. 61 Current forecasts indicate that the Enterprise will be
able to make such purchases without the aid of mandatory transfer. 62
Moreover, the Convention requires that any mandatory transfers be
made on fair and reasonable commercial terms, 63 and the provision for
the transfer of technology expires ten years after the Enterprise com-
mences commercial production."
C. THE "PARALLEL SYSTEM": BASIC CONDITIONS OF
PROSPECTING, EXPLORATION, AND EXPLOITATION
Annex III of the Convention delineates the "Basic Conditions for
Prospecting, Exploration, and Exploitation," and establishes a "paral-
lel system" for Area development. The United States proposed the
"parallel system" in 1976 in response to the deadlock between the
developed and the developing countries regarding the proper ambit for
the Authority's power within the context of a regime founded upon
the common heritage concept. The "parallel system" compromise is
intended to allow both the developed and the developing nations to
concurrently exploit the deep seabed 65 by assuring that the developing
countries receive both the necessary financing 66 and technology. 67
At the time of the deadlock, the developed countries acknow-
ledged that the common heritage principle implied some degree of
59. See Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 58, at 91-92; Bailey, supra note 58, at 74; Rich-
ardson, supra note 18, at 444; Richardson, supra note 14, at 10-12.
60. Convention, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5; see infra text accompanying notes 137-
41.
61. Id. art. 5, para. 3.
62. Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 58, at 91-92; see also Bailey, supra note 58, at 74-75;
Richardson, supra note 18, at 444; Richardson, supra note 14, at 11; Van Dyke &
Teichmann, Transfer of Seabed Mining Technology: A Stumbling Block to U.S. Ratification
of the Law of the Sea Convention?, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 427 (1984); infra text
accompanying notes 137-41.
63. Convention, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5, para. 3.
64. Id. Annex III, art. 5, para. 7.
65. See Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Conference, 75
DEP'T ST. BULL. 395 (Sept. 27, 1976) (remarks of Secretary Kissinger at UNCLOS III
reception, Sept. 1, 1976). "At the last session, the United States proposed the system of
parallel access in which, concurrently with any state or private mining of the deep seabeds,
a similar site would have to be set aside for the international community to be exploited or
mined by the international community." Id. at 398.
66. See id. "[Tlhe United States would be prepared to agree to a means of financing
the Enterprise in such a manner that the Enterprise could begin its mining operation either
concurrently with the mining of state or private enterprises or within an agreed time-span
that was practically concurrent." Id.
67. See id. Secretary Kissinger expressed U.S. willingness to negotiate "provisions for
the transfer of technology so that the existing advantage of certain industrial states would
be equalized over a period of time." Id.
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international control over mining operations, but stopped short of
envisioning a system in which the Authority itself would carry out
mining operations.6 8 Instead, the industrial countries argued that the
Authority's role should be limited to licensing and ensuring compli-
ance with regulations controlling seabed mining operations.6 9
In contrast, the Group of 77, a coalition now consisting of over
one hundred developing countries70 sought "a monolithic parastatal
entity for seabed exploitation along the lines of a nationalized industry
in a socialist country. ' 71 That position was based upon the belief that
because the resources of the Area are res communes, all Area activities
should be conducted by an entity controlled by the entire world com-
munity.7 2 Clearly, such a regime would have immediately halted
plans for the initiation of seabed mining. Essential capital contribu-
tions from the developed countries would have been wanting, and the
ability to acquire the necessary technology would have been
uncertain.7 3
The parallel system proved acceptable to both the West and the
Group of 77, and was incorporated into the Convention as Annex
III.74 Under this system, state-sponsored private mining, State-party
ventures, 75 and the Enterprise7 6 will carry out activities in the Area.77
To advance the goal of concurrent development, private and state
sponsored mining ventures must satisfy two requirements not imposed
on the Enterprise.7 8 First, they must submit "dual nominations.
79
68. Richardson, supra note 18, at 440.
69. Id.
70. See Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent
Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1979).
71. Richardson, supra note 18, at 440; see also Charney, The International Regime for
the Deep Seabed: Past Conflicts and Proposals for Progress, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 6
(1976):
[The Group of 77] have sought control of the exploitation of the deep seabed
through the control of the Authority, giving it full power to take actions they deem
necessary to protect their interests. For example, they have sought to provide the
Authority with the power to conduct the exploitation of the resource itself to the
exclusion of the industry of any particular nation. They have also supported giving
the Authority the power to control directly the activities of any entity that it per-
mits to undertake Activities in the Area, to pace the development of the seabed, to
set prices, and finally, to provide for protection to land based developing country
producers if they suffer from competition with seabed mining.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
72. Richardson, supra note 14, at 5.
73. Richardson, supra note 18, at 440.
74. See Charney, The Law of the Deep Seabed Post UNCLOS III, 63 OR. L. Rlv. 19,
34 (1984).
75. Convention, supra note 4, art. 153, para. 2(b); Annex III, art. 4, para. 1.
76. Id. art. 153, para. 2(a).
77. State-sponsored private mining is done by private mining companies under the flag
of one or more nations which are party to the Convention. State-party ventures refer to
mining done by state mining agencies.
78. See Charney, supra note 74, at 34-35.
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Each application, other than those submitted by the Enterprise or a
developing nation, must cover a total area large enough for two min-
ing operations of approximately equal commercial value.80 The
Authority then designates one of the sites to the applicant and reserves
the other site for the Enterprise or a mining group associated with one
or more of the developing states."' Second, for a period of ten years82
each applicant must provide the Enterprise and developing nations all
technology and equipment used to carry out the activities in the Area
if such technology and equipment are unavailable on the open
market.8 3
III. THE UNITED STATES' OBJECTIONS TO THE
CONVENTION
A. IDEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS
Critics of the Convention lament what they view as a failure on
the part of Western UNCLOS III delegations to emphasize philosoph-
ical issues at the Conference.8 4 They argue that this failure invited the
Group of 77 to fill the resulting "ideological vacuum" with self-serving
economic doctrines designed to guarantee the developing countries a
significant role in seabed development.8 5
Any ideological flexibility of U.S. UNCLOS III negotiators dur-
ing the Carter administration was quickly displaced by the ideological
rigidity of Reagan administration diplomats. As a presidential candi-
date, Mr. Reagan emphasized that the United States must reassert its
interests in multilateral negotiations.8 6 Indeed, UNCLOS III was
cited as the type of diplomatic weakness that the new President vowed
to correct.8 7 After the final negotiating session of the Conference, the
United States realized that it would not be able to incorporate desired
79. Convention, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 8.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The mandatory transfer of technology will remain a requirement for ten years after
the Enterprise begins commercial production. Id. Annex III, art. 7.
83. Id. Annex III, art. 5.
84. See, eg., Bandow, supra note 13, at 477.
85. Id. at 478.
86. See id. "The Reagan administration is no longer willing to cede the moral high
ground, as it believes its principles of government and economics to be right and worth
defending." Id.
87. See The Republican Party 1980 Platform, reprinted in 126 CONG. REc. 20, 616-37
(1980):
Multilateral negotiations have thus far insufficiently focused attention on U.S. long
term security requirements. A pertinent example of this phenomenon is the Law
of the Sea Conference, where negotiations have served to inhibit U.S. exploration
of the seabed for its abundant mineral resources. Too much concern has been
lavished on nations unable to carry out seabed mining, with insufficient attention
paid to gaining early American access to it. A Republican Administration will
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changes into the Convention. Given his pre-election posturing, Presi-
dent Reagan could not approve the signing of the Convention. The
Reagan Administration considered the Convention's ideological flaws
"largely a result of earlier concessions made by U.S. negotiators who,
seeking to promote multilateral negotiation by negotiating a treaty for
its own sake, underestimated the impact of Part XI on key national
and strategic interests." 88
Among the ideological issues cited for the U.S. rejection of the
Convention was the perception that the treaty restricts economic free-
dom in ways inconsistent with free market principles.89 Such restric-
tions include those Articles of the Convention that limit entry into the
market,90 set a ceiling on annual production,91 and mandate a transfer
of technology. 92 Despite domestic and international criticism that the
alternative to the Convention, the Provisional Understanding, is isola-
tionist and that the Convention's objectionable features are unlikely to
be invoked to restrict U.S. mining interests, 93 the United States has
steadfastly rejected such perceived economic restrictions. 94
The United States also objects to a perceived distortion of the
"common heritage of mankind" doctrine. The Reagan Administra-
tion contends that this concept, as applied by the developing countries
within the context of the Convention, provides nations which would
otherwise play no role in seabed development with an equal say in
governing the seabed, and permits them to profit undeservedly from
Western exploration and exploitation of the Area. Consequently,
while the United States favors international agreement and coopera-
conduct multilateral negotiations in a manner that reflects America's abilities and
long-term interest in access to raw materials and energy resources.
Id.
88. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 796
(1984); see also Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 1006, 1008 (1982). The Convention "was incompatible with President Rea-
gan's apparent desire to return the United States to a period of power and influence in
world affairs in which its policies would simply be enunciated rather than sold to others
through a process of diplomacy and negotiation." Id. (Mr. Ratiner, Deputy Chairman of
the U.S. Delegation to the Final Negotiating Session of UNCLOS III, was a participant in
the Reagan Administration's review of the Convention).
89. Bandow, supra note 13, at 480.
90. Convention, supra note 4, art. 151, paras. 2-3.
91. Id. art. 151, paras. 3-4.
92. Iad Annex III, art. 5.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 148-64, 126-45.
94. See Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea After UNCLOS III, 46:2
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 32 (1983).
The United States has a right to insist upon international mechanisms and policies
that are consistent with our free market and democratic principles. It is because of
these principles that America obtained her present wealth and high standard of
living-it is these same principles which will promote international growth and
freedom.
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tion in defining the appropriate guidelines for seabed development, it
will not accede to a treaty under which "the developing states may
assert many rights, but ... are burdened with very few reciprocal
obligations." 95
The Reagan Administration is further concerned that accepting
the Convention will have the precedential effect of legitimizing the
New International Economic Order (the "NIEO"). 96 The Group of
77 views the Convention as a crucial opportunity to initiate the estab-
lishment of a more favorable international economic order.97 Viewing
the Convention as the first step in an ongoing effort to make the NIEO
a characteristic of all international agreements and organizations, the
Group of 77 became intransigent on those provisions most antithetical
to free market principles.98 Because those same provisions were con-
trary to the political and economic freedom that formed the basis of
President Reagan's mandate on international relations and world eco-
nomic development,99 the U.S. delegation was equally intractable. As
a result, the Convention contained provisions which the Reagan
administration perceived as inimical to U.S. interests and therefore
wholly unacceptable.
B. PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS
In addition to its ideological objections to the Convention, the
Reagan Administration has also identified several flaws in the agree-
ment that, notwithstanding any philosophical differences, mandate its
rejection on practical grounds. First is the possibility of arbitrary or
discriminatory licensing and a lack of assured access to specific seabed
95. Id.; see also Bandow, supra note 13, at 479-80.
96. See Bandow, supra note 13, at 486-87; Malone, supra note 88, at 796; Malone,
supra note 94, at 31. The NIEO, as put forth in the U.N. General Assembly's Declaration
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, is intended, inter alia, to
"correct inequalities and redress existing injustices ... eliminate the widening gap between
the developed and developing countries ... [and to give] preferential and non-reciprocal
treatment for developing countries, wherever feasible, in all fields of international eco-
nomic co-operation whenever possible ...." Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715, 716, 718
(1974). Scholars are in general agreement regarding the NIEO's primary economic objec-
tives: "[I]ncreasing LDCs' [Less Developed Countries'] control over their economic
destiny; accelerating the LDCs' growth rate; trippling [sic] the share of global industrial
production conducted in the LDC by the year 2000; and narrowing the gap in per capita
income between the developed countries." Kreinin & Finger, A Critical Survey of the New
International Economic Order, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 493, 493 (1976); see also Gamble &
Frankowska, International Law's Response to the New International Economic Order: An
Overview, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 257, 259 (1986).
97. Comment, UNCLOS Il" The Remaining Obstacles to Consensus on the Deepsea
Mining Regime, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 79, 81 (1981).
98. Malone, supra note 88, at 796.
99. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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mining sites. Although the access criteria detailed in the Convention
are nondiscriminatory,1 00 the United States fears that the licensing
process could become politicized.101 The Convention's critics base
this criticism primarily on the complex election procedures of the
Council, the arm of the Authority responsible for licensing deci-
sions.102 The United States also contends that the Convention's deci-
sion-making process imposes unnecessary regulation, bureaucracy,
and risk. The architects of current U.S. ocean policy therefore argue
that the Convention is too complex for a high-risk industry that has
100. Comment, supra note 97, at 103.
101. Bandow, supra note 13, at 484.
102. See Seabed Council Seen as Hostile to Mining (remarks of Brian Hoyle), in CON-
SENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CON-
VENTION 265 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1982) [hereinafter CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION].
The Council, the executive organ of the Authority, is composed of members elected by
the Assembly. Article 161 provides in part:
1. The Council shall consist of 36 members of the Authority elected by the
Assembly in the following order:
(a) four members from among those States Parties which, during the last five
years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than 2 per cent
of total world imports of the commodities produced from the categories of miner-
als to be derived from the Area, and in any case one State from the Eastern Euro-
pean (Socialist) region as well as the largest consumer;
(b) four members from among the eight States Parties which have the largest
investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, either
directly or through their nationals, including at least one State from the Eastern
European (Socialist) region;
(c) four members from among states parties which on the basis of production in
areas under their jurisdiction are major net exporters of the categories of minerals
to be derived from the Area, including at least two developing countries whose
exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their economies;
(d) six members from among developing countries, representing special interests.
The special interests to be represented shall include those of States with large
populations, States which are land-locked or geographically disadvantaged, States
which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the
Area, states which are potential producers of such minerals and least developed
countries;
(e) eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equitable
geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that each
geographical region shall have at least one member elected under this subpara-
graph. For this purpose the geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia, Eastern
European (Socialist), Latin America and Western Europe, and others.
Convention, supra note 4, art. 161.
Voting in the Council on matters of substance is to be by two-thirds of those present and
voting. Id. art. 161(8). Its powers include the establishment of specific policies, the exer-
cise of control over the Enterprise, the initiation of complaints before the Seabed Disputes
Chamber, and the power to approve work plans submitted by states or their nationals for
seabed mining permits. Such proposed plans are deemed to be approved unless rejected by
a three-fourths majority within sixty days of the submission of the plan to the Council by
the Technical Commission, a subsidiary organ of the Council. Id. arts. 162, 163, 165; see
also Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Mineral
Resources by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 396 & n.385 (1980).
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never engaged in commercial production.10 3 The United States simply
refuses to trust an international seabed authority that "has no track
record but has a massive bureaucracy."'04
A second practical objection of the United States concerns the
production ceiling. 10 5 This "limitation" on seabed development is
intended to allow terrestrial producers an interim period 0 6 to adapt to
the increased supply of minerals resulting from seabed mining.'0 7
Objections to the Convention based upon the production ceiling, how-
ever, are virtually meritless. Even the Convention's critics often con-
cede that market forces, not the production ceiling, will establish the
level of production during the interim period. 01 Notwithstanding the
production ceiling's liberal requirements, the United States claims the
ceiling reflects a broader anti-production bias permeating the Conven-
tion. One critic 09 cites, as examples of this antiproduction bias, Con-
vention provisions that call for "orderly, safe and rational
management of the Area,... the promotion of just and stable prices
remunerative to producers and fair to consumers,... [and] the protec-
tion of developing countries from adverse effects on their economies or
export earnings resulting from ... activities in the Area." 110
A third practical objection to the Convention is its provision for
mandatory transfer of technology."' Like the production ceiling, the
practical effect of this provision is disputed.1' 2 Critics of the Conven-
tion concede that the circumstances for such transfers are limited and
require reasonable commercial terms, but nevertheless argue that tech-
nology transfers under the Convention "could never be fair to private
contractors."' 13
Furthermore, the United States believed that it could reject the
Convention and yet be bound by, and benefit from, those Convention
provisions advantageous to its interests.' 14 The United States claimed
103. The U.S. Position on Deep Seabed Mining (remarks of Brian Hoyle), in CONSENSUS
AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 102, at 250. "We believe that regime set out in Part XI
is massive overkill." Id.
104. Id. at 251.
105. Convention, supra note 4, art. 151, paras. 2-4.
106. Id. para. 3; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
107. Comment, supra note 97, at 104.
108. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 131-36.
109. Bandow, supra note 13, at 483.
110. Convention, supra note 4, art. 150, paras. (b), (f) & (h).
111. Id. Annex III, art. 5.
112. See, e.g., Van Dyke & Teichmarm, supra note 62; see also infra text accompanying
notes 137-41.
113. Bandow, supra note 13, at 484.
114. These provisions include, inter alia, guaranteed passage through international
straits and other zones of coastal jurisdiction; freedom of military and commercial naviga-
tion, as well as scientific research, in the exclusive economic zone; exploitation of non-living
resources of the continental shelf and the continental margin; protection of marine environ-
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"that these... benefits would be accepted by other nations because the
treaty reflects custom-an accepted way of formulating international
law." s Others argue, however, that the Convention was negotiated
as a "package deal," whereby no nation may accept selected elements
while rejecting the whole.1 16
IV. RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES CRITICISMS OF
THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
Aspects of the Convention undoubtedly conflict with U.S. free
market philosophy. This conflict is not surprising because it is unreal-
istic to expect that an international agreement among so many nations
will mirror the economic ideology of any single participant. Given the
divergent goals of the world's nations, compromise on ideological
issues is an essential element of virtually all treaties, particularly one
as ambitious as the Convention. Since ideological concessions were
inevitable in the Convention, the Administration erred in rejecting an
agreement which offered the United States both opportunities for eco-
nomic gain and stability within the world community.
The Administration's rejection of the Convention reflects a disap-
pointing unwillingness to accept the contemporary world as one of
global interdependence. The United States can no longer attempt to
dominate world affairs simply by imposing its views on other coun-
tries. Only through multilateral fora can this era's most pressing
world problems be adequately addressed. 117
By failing to recognize this crucial geopolitical reality, the United
States risks slipping "further into some form of international, political,
economic, and social isolation with the image of an international out-
law or outcast.""1 " In order to maintain and strengthen its position as
a world leader, the United States must eschew this isolationist stance.
UNCLOS III, the largest and longest United Nations Conference ever,
was of particular importance to the Group of 77. The United States
stood to gain a great deal in long-term international relations by being
more open to compromise with the Group of 77.119 Instead, by
ment; management of the ocean's fisheries; and a comprehensive dispute settlement mecha-
nism. See Arrow, supra note 102, at 408; McCloskey & Losch, The U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference and the U.S. Congress: Will Pending U.S. Unilateral Action on Deep Seabed
Mining Destroy Hope for a Treaty?, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 240, 241-46 (1979); Ratiner,
supra note 88, at 1018.
115. Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1018.
116. See Arrow, supra note 102, at 407-13; Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1018-19; see also
infra text accompanying notes 144-46.
117. See Address by Elliot L. Richardson, Interdependence x Political Necessity= The
Need for Law, 1981 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 206 [hereinafter Richardson Address].
118. Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L.J. 337, 356 (1985).
119. See Arrow, supra note 102, at 414.
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rejecting the treaty, the United States has sent a signal that the Third
World may interpret as illustrating not only economic greed, but also
resistance to the notion of sovereign equality.1 20
The United States should exhibit more willingness to engage in
meaningful multilateral negotiations toward binding international
obligations, even at the expense of ideological purity when practical
U.S. interests are not compromised significantly. 121 Absent a genuine
desire by the United States to participate in fruitful international nego-
tiations, developing nations have little reason to seek U.S. leadership
and guidance in world affairs. In criticizing the Convention, a Reagan
Administration official contended that rejecting the Convention
"would help forestall the creation of other negotiating forae and inter-
national structures to regulate other international economic issues."' 122
This lamentable blindness to the implications of global interdepen-
dence threatens U.S. influence in the Third World vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. Indeed, the deadlock on ideological issues that characterized
the dialogue between the West and the Group of 77 at UNCLOS III
was "exploited by the Soviet Union as a means to consolidate its influ-
ence with the 'non-aligned nations' and to isolate further the United
States and its allies within the 'world community'."1 23
Clearly, the Convention contains provisions at odds with U.S.
economic philosophy. The Group of 77 used the "common heritage of
mankind" doctrine to give developing countries a disproportionate
voice in seabed development. In addition, the Convention can be
viewed as moving toward a legitimization of the NIEO. The question
remains, however, whether these philosophically objectionable inclu-
sions necessarily required rejection of the Convention. Apparently,
the Reagan Adminstration concluded that the ideological com-
promises in the Convention, when weighed against the forfeited practi-
cal benefits and the detriments of isolation within the world
community, were sufficiently objectionable to warrant rejection of the
treaty. In rejecting the Convention, the United States risks that upon
ratification of the Convention, many nations will realize they can
shape important international policy without U.S. participation. 24
This realization will ultimately lessen the ability of the United States
to influence future multilateral negotiations.125
120. IdL
121. Richardson Address, supra note 117, at 210.
122. Bandow, supra note 13, at 487.
123. Malone, supra note 88, at 797; see also Charney, supra note 74, at 51.
124. Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1020.
125. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 10; see also Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1020: "In
short, the guardians of pure conservative ideology may have won a battle when the United
States stood alone at the Law of the Sea Conference, but the United States may lose a very
important war." Id
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The U.S. insistence on ideological purity is isolating it from much
of the world community and demonstrates a reluctance to engage in
meaningful and binding international negotiations. Such rigidity
would be justified if the United States deemed the Convention inimical
to U.S. mining interests from a practical perspective. Such a func-
tional evaluation of the Convention 26 reveals, however, that the prac-
tical objections to the Convention were not so weighty as to justify
rejection.
To satisfactorily protect mining interests, the Convention must
include provisions which guarantee potential miners assured access to
selected sites. Under the Convention, the Council will be responsible
for licensing. Although the Council's election procedures are com-
plex,127 the actual process for contract approval is "well-nigh auto-
matic," if the applicant is sponsored by a state party and meets various
financial and technical requirements. 28 The Legal and Technical
Commission, a fifteen-member panel elected by a three-fourths major-
ity of the Council, approves all work plans. 129 Notwithstanding the
complexities that characterize the licensing agencies, "the automatic-
ity of the system could only be frustrated if three-fourths of the Coun-
cil made a conscious and determined effort to elect unsuitable
Commission members who would ignore the requirements of the...
Convention."'130 Perhaps more importantly, once the Council
approves a mining plan, the miners will operate with the sanction of
virtually the entire world community. Fundamental to the notion of
assured access is a regime whereby specific mining rights are recog-
nized by all potential miners. Unlike the Provisional Understanding,
the Convention contemplates such a regime.
Two additional practical objections to the Convention by the
United States, regarding the production ceiling and the transfer of
technology provisions, are likely "more apparent than real."' 3' These
provisions will probably never inhibit U.S. seabed mining. Whether
the production ceiling will have any practical effect has been repeat-
edly questioned. 32 The authors of a recent study conclude that the
production limitation is set sufficiently high as to have no probable
126. For an argument in favor of a purely functional evaluation, see Katz, supra note 7.
127. See supra note 102.
128. Richardson, supra note 18, at 442.
129. Convention, supra note 4, art. 163, para. 2.
130. Richardson, supra note 18, at 442.
131. Bailey, supra note 58, at 74; see also Richardson, supra note 18, at 443-44.
132. Although the production ceiling is effective for an interim period of twenty-five
years, it will only effect those commercial mining projects operating during the industry's
first fifteen years. Because the interim period begins five years before commercial produc-
tion begins, it covers only twenty years of production. In addition, contracts signed in the
last five years of the interim period can call for production to begin after the production
ceiling expires. Richardson, supra note 18, at 444 n.21.
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effect on commercial production. 133 This conclusion accords with the
U.S. State Department consistently maintained projections. 134 Under
the Convention regime, the level of seabed mineral production will be
set, in all likelihood, not by any artificially imposed limitations, but
rather by market forces. Seen in this light, the production limits are
not, in a practical sense, objectionable. The first policy objective listed
in Article 150, calling for "the development of the resources of the
Area,"1 35 undercuts the contention that the Convention has an anti-
production bias. Indeed, the sequence and wording of the final text of
Article 150 represents a concession by the Group of 77, making com-
mercial development of the Area a central goal. This objective was
expressed only with some qualifications in previous drafts. 136 The
final draft unambiguously states the developed countries' goal of com-
mercial development.
The provision for the transfer of technology 137 is similarly limited
in its potential practical effect. Sales of technology are mandated only
upon a showing that the equipment or its equivalent is unavailable on
the open market. 138 Current projections indicate that the necessary
seabed mining technologies will be generally available for open market
purchase.13 9 Even if a sale is mandated, it must be on fair and reason-
able commercial terms. 4° Moreover, the technology transfer provi-
sion expires ten years after the Enterprise has begun commercial
production. 141
Unfortunately, despite their limited potential effect, the United
States viewed these provisions as fatal to the Convention. Rejecting an
agreement with so many favorable features 142 because it contains a
limited number of arguably objectionable clauses unlikely to effect
U.S. mining interests must be seen as highly questionable at best.143
133. Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 58, at 79-99. (Evaluation of the potential commer-
cial effects of the production ceiling, transfer of technology, and other provisions found
objectionable by the Reagan administration reveals that "significant deterrence of ocean
mining is unlikely to occur, at least through the first two decades of the next century.")
134. See Katz, supra note 7, at 129 & n.96.
135. Convention, supra note 4, art. 150(a).
136. Unlike earlier drafts, the final Convention text separates subparagraph (a) from
subparagraph (b) (which calls for controlled development of the Area), thereby allowing
the first goal listed to encourage unqualified Area development. Convention, supra note 4,
art. 150(a), (b); see also CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 102, at 270-71 &
n.20.
137. Convention, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5. See generally Van Dyke &
Teichmann, supra note 62 (overview of the Convention's technology transfer provisions).
138. Convention, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5, para. 3(a).
139. Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 58, at 79-99.
140. Convention, supra note 4, art. 144, para. 2(b); Annex III, art. 5, para. 3(a).
141. Id. Annex III, art. 5, para. 7.
142. See supra note 114.
143. Richardson, supra note 14, at 11-12. "It is odd that a country which invented
pragmatism should let these objections stand in the way of the opportunity to engage in
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Finally, the Reagan Administration's view that the United States
could remain outside of the Convention, and at the same time claim to
benefit from those favorable provisions has been repeatedly rejected.144
The more persuasive position is that the Convention creates rights
only for parties who assume responsibilities under it.' as Given the
weight of opinion to the contrary, the Administration may be gravely
in error in assuming it can reject the Convention while remaining free
to pick and choose among its benefits.146 The resulting losses to the
United States147 are especially disappointing in light of the dubious
foundation of the U.S. decision to reject the Convention.
V. THE PROVISIONAL UNDERSTANDING
Upon the failure of the Convention, eight Western industrialized
nations 148 entered into the Provisional Understanding on August 3,
1984.149 Although the Group of 77 immediately denounced the agree-
ment as "wholly illegal,"150 the Provisional Understanding is probably
legal because it neither claims sovereignty or ownership over portions
of the seabed, nor grants exclusive rights to any area of the seabed that
are intended to be valid against the rest of the world.15' Notwith-
standing its probable, albeit unsettled, legality, it is doubtful whether
the Provisional Understanding creates a regime conducive to long
term mining.15 2
The Provisional Understanding is essentially a "nonpoaching"
agreement, imposing upon its parties an obligation of self-restraint.
The Provisional Understanding dictates that no party will engage or
seek to engage in mining operations that would conflict with those of
another party.' 53 Each party agrees to respect the claims of the other
parties and, consistent with the res nullius principle, each party recog-
nizes that no state may claim sovereignty over any site.
The Provisional Understanding reflects its parties' disdain for the
complex bureaucracy called for in the Convention. A remarkably lean
agreement covering less than six pages, the Provisional Understanding
is intended to assure unimpeded access to chosen mining sites. It
deep seabed mining when there is so little prospect that the treaty's objectionable features
will ever have to be faced squarely." Id.
144. See, eg., Arrow, supra note 102, at 407; Larson, supra note 118, at 353 & n.33;
Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1018; Richardson, supra note 14, at 17 & n.33.
145. See Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1018.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1018-19; Arrow, supra note 102, at 407-13.
148. See supra note 5.
149. See supra note 6.
150. Seabed Mining Agreement Denounced, WEsT AFRICA, Aug. 27, 1984, at 1742.
151. Mashayekhi, supra note 17, at 248.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 163-85.
153. Provisional Understanding, supra note 6, para. 1.
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emphasizes expediency, calling upon its parties to use "reasonable dis-
patch" in determining whether an application complies with the appli-
cant's national law and is therefore eligible for an authorization. 154
When an application is accepted for an authorization, each party shall
immediately notify the other parties of its action.' 55 This notice
requirement presumably will avoid the processing of multiple authori-
zations for a single site, because each party will have a perpetually
updated record of authorized sites. The notice requirement should
also obviate the need for post hoc determinations of priority among
competing authorizations. The agreement also requires consultation
among the relevant parties in the event that two or more overlapping
applications are filed simultaneously. 56
To further encourage smooth development of seabed mining, the
Provisional Understanding calls for extensive communication and
cooperation among the parties. To eliminate conflict among develop-
ment goals, the parties agree to consult before initiating seabed mining
operations, 157 to ensure that no two parties will begin planning devel-
opment of the same site. Similarly, the parties shall notify one another
regarding any new domestic legal provisions or modifications of
existing legislation, 158 and the parties shall consult together "generally
with a view to coordinating and reviewing the implementation of [the]
agreement."' 159 In addition, the parties agree to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the size and location of application areas, 160 as well as any
"other proprietary or confidential commercial information received in
confidence from any other Party in pursuance of cooperation in regard
to deep seabed operations."'16'
The Provisional Understanding is in accord with free market ide-
ology because it lacks any requirements for dual nominations,
mandatory transfer of technology, or limitations on production. The-
oretically, the agreement is fully satisfactory. Indeed, assuming that
no party denounces the agreement wholly162 or as between one or
more specific parties, 163 the Provisional Understanding would allow
154. Id. para. 2.
155. Id. para. 3.
156. Id para. 5(2).
157. Id. para. 5(1)(a).
158. Id. para. 5(1)(c).
159. Id. para. 5(1)(d).
160. Id. para. 6(1).
161. Id.
162. Id. para. 14(1). "A party may denounce this agreement by written notice to all
other parties .... Such denunciation shall become effective 180 days from the date of the
latest receipt of such notice." Id.
163. Id. para. 14(2). "A party may, for good cause related to the implementation of this
Agreement, after consultation, serve written notice on another Party that, from a date not
less than 90 days thereafter, it will cease to give effect to paragraph I of this Agreement
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for a relatively stable development of the seabed-that is, if the eight
parties to the agreement were the only nations interested in seabed
mining. Unfortunately, the Provisional Understanding neglects to
account for the rest of the world. It does not recognize or support any
claim by non-party investors. Consistent with the U.S. position in
rejecting the Convention, the Provisional Understanding contemplates
a seabed mining regime which operates independent of most of the
world community-countries interested enough in seabed mining to
exhaustively negotiate Part XI of the Convention. Such an approach
is at best questionable absent non-party mining; where potential min-
ers exist outside of the agreement, it is unworkable.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROVISIONAL
UNDERSTANDING REGIME
The isolationism upon which the Provisional Understanding is
founded creates a serious obstacle to any stable system of seabed min-
ing under the agreement. The fundamental question is how will the
Provisional Understanding parties control seabed activities by non-
party mining operations. The Provisional Understanding lacks any
system of control over nations not party to the agreement. When non-
parties, already hostile to the Provisional Understanding's "alterna-
tive" regime, poach upon mining sites claimed by parties to the Provi-
sional Understanding, the parties will be faced with a difficult
confrontation. The uncertain results of such likely confrontations
makes mining under the Provisional Understanding extremely risky.
Consequently, Western banks will be unwilling to finance seabed min-
ing operations where assured access is not guaranteed. It is ironic that
the United States sacrificed the numerous advantages of the Conven-
tion because it did not satisfactorily guarantee access only to enter into
a regime where access is assured among only eight nations.
Increasing the riskiness and instability of mining under the Provi-
sional Understanding is the possibility of a challenge by non-parties in
the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ"). 164 Such an action
would not challenge the legality of the Provisional Understanding
itself, but rather any mining undertaken outside of the Convention.
For example, Tommy T.B. Koh, the second and last President of the
Law of the Sea Conference, has stated that if the United States engages
in seabed mining through an alternative regime, he will bring an action
in the ICJ requesting an advisory opinion declaring such mining ile-
with respect to such other party. The rights and obligations of these two parties towards
the other parties remain unaffected by such notice." Id.
164. See infra note 169.
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gal.165 Such an opinion would only be effective if the Provisional
Understanding parties choose to comply with the Court's decision and
enforce it domestically. 166 Although such domestic enforcement is
discretionary,1 67 David Colson, the State Department lawyer most
directly involved in ocean affairs, believes that the United States would
abide by a clear ICJ decision based upon legal reasoning rather than
political factors.1 68
The risk of an adverse ICJ decision and the parties' inability to
exclude competing non-party claims makes the Provisional Under-
standing regime extremely uncertain. This uncertainty raises a para-
dox for the proponents of the free market approach. Given the high
risk of seabed mining under the Provisional Understanding, Western
banks will be unwilling to finance seabed activities under such a
regime. 169 Therefore, to promote seabed mining, parties to the Provi-
sional Understanding will need to provide either huge government
subsidies, government insurance, or both. This compromise of free
market ideals, however, is precisely the type of concession that made
the Convention unacceptable to the Reagan Administration. Thus,
the United States has sacrificed the seabed mining opportunities of the
Convention, which were considered adverse to free market principles,
for an agreement of suspect efficacy that will require similar ideologi-
cal compromises. Although the Provisional Understanding ostensibly
comports with the Reagan Administration's ideological requirements,
in practice the agreement will require government involvement at a
level incompatible with laissez-faire economic theory.1 70
There are additional, more fundamental, flaws in the Provisional
Understanding that may be problematic even within its contemplated
eight-nation regime. Coordinating the parties' various domestic legis-
lation on seabed mining will be difficult. The Provisional Understand-
ing requires each party to act in accord with its national legislation.17 1
165. The Dispute Will Be Submitted to the International Court of Justice (remarks of
Tommy T.B. Koh), in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 102, at 253; see also
Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1017 ("The resulting protracted litigation would have a chilling
effect on seabed mineral investment.").
166. Moss, Insuring Unilaterally Licensed Deep Seabed Mining Operations Against
Adverse Rulings by the International Court of Justice, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 161,
175 (1984).
167. Id.
168. Submission of the Issue to the International Court of Justice (remarks of David
Colson), in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 102, at 260. At the same time,
however, Colson has expressed doubts that such an action would succeed. Id.
169. Molitor, supra note 25, at 601 ("Until the lending institutions [are] completely con-
vinced that the industry [has] 'assured' access to a portion of the deep seabed large enough
to maintain a commercially operative mining venture for 25 years, not one red cent [will] be
approved." (footnotes omitted)).
170. See infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
171. Provisional Understanding, supra note 6, para. 9.
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The agreement also dictates that the parties shall seek consistency in
their application requirements and operating standards. 172 Absent a
multinational governing body to oversee seabed activities, coordinat-
ing the parties' seabed mining efforts will be quite difficult. Any such
agency, however, would necessarily share some of the characteristics
of the Authority, and therefore presumably be unacceptable.17 3 Once
again, the Provisional Understanding's practical application presents a
departure from the parties' original free market motives. In fact, the
agreement increasingly appears to mirror the Convention, but without
the Convention's corresponding benefits. The inconsistencies within
the regime that could result may prompt one or more parties to
denounce the agreement. 174 Such action would add to the difficulties
resulting from the parties' inability to monitor the activities of non-
parties.
B. THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION
Although perhaps laudable for adhering to laissez-faire princi-
ples, the Provisional Understanding is unfortunately an agreement
under which profitable long-term seabed mining is unlikely. By under-
estimating global interdependence in deep seabed matters, the parties
to the Provisional Understanding have taken an unrealistic and pro-
vincial approach to a uniquely international issue. The Provisional
Understanding offers the U.S. far less opportunity for successful com-
mercial seabed mining than would a universally accepted U.N. Con-
vention, especially in light of international hostility toward the
Provisional Understanding's isolationist stance.
For example, a particularly troubling issue has been whether the
U.S. mining concerns can generate the capital necesssary to initiate
full-scale seabed mining. Currently, estimates for such a project range
from $1 billion to $2 billion.1 75 Western banks will be unwilling to
finance projects of this magnitude without the assurance of a regime
that will foster profitable mining projects.176 Although the Conven-
tion's critics contend that the Convention imposes too much regula-
172. Id. para. 8.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
174. Provisional Understanding, supra note 6, para. 14; see also supra notes 162-63.
175. See McCloskey, A View from the Hill-Reconciliation of Our Divergent Interests, in
WHAT LAW Now FOR THE SEAs? 49, 54 (C. Maw ed. 1984) [hereinafter WHAT LAW
Now?] ($1.5 billion estimate). Ten years ago, the industry average for the first operational
system was estimated between $500 million and $750 million: $25 million to $50 million
for exploration, $100 million to $150 million for research and development, and $375 mil-
lion to $550 million for the prototype system (including miner and mining ship, processing,
and transportation). Deep Seabed Mining: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanogra-
phy and the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 215
(1977).
176. Molitor, supra note 25, at 601.
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tion and bureaucracy and therefore too great a risk, 177 proponents of
the Convention argue that despite its shortcomings, the Convention at
least guarantees that mining can take place under a regime universally
recognized as legal. 17 8 In contrast, the Provisional Understanding
guarantees noninterference only among its eight signatories. Given
the large capital investments required, such a narrow guarantee of
mine site security will probably be unsatisfactory to risk-conscious
lenders. 179
It should be noted that retaliatory action by the Convention par-
ties against mining conducted under the Provisional Understanding is
highly likely, and that such hostility would be legitimized under article
137(3) of the Convention. The article provides that "no state.., shall
claim, acquire, or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recov-
ered from the Area except in accordance with [Part XI of the Conven-
tion]."' 180 Under this article, the Convention parties may ignore
mining claims under the Provisional Understanding, and would argua-
bly be within their rights to adopt confrontational measures aimed at
protecting interests claimed under the Convention. 181 The prospect of
retaliation introduces additional risk,182 making the financing of min-
177. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
178. Richardson, supra note 10, at 508-09.
179. Leigh Ratiner, former Deputy Chairman of the U.S. Delegation on the Law of the
Sea Conference, has summarized the primary practical obstacle to mining outside of the
Convention:
[C]an a mining company get clear title to mineral resources on the deep seabed
sufficient to take to the bank or to a Senior Vice President for Financial Affairs in
his corporation, and obtain one-half billion dollars in 1980 dollars, or commit-
ments to that amount, when 150-odd countries, give or take a few, say that claim-
ing title to those resources is unlawful? In my judgment, it is inconceivable that
any company will mine outside the Law of the Sea Treaty, and the United States
mining companies are unlikely to do so because they have an attractive alternative
available to them-and that is the prospect of mining under the flags of the coun-
tries who do sign the Law of the Sea Treaty, and therefore obtain reasonably clear
title ....
I think that until the Administration can offer some showing of how secure,
clear title can be given to a mining company outside the Treaty sufficient to
impress financiers, the Administration has basically made a decision which is not
only contrary to America's interest in direct access to strategic raw materials in the
deep ocean, but the Administration has taken an action which is contrary to the
interests of the mining companies as well, many of whom supported the Adminis-
tration in this suicidal course of action.
Ratiner, Where Do We Go From Here-Our Options and Alternatives, in WHAT LAW
NoW?, supra note 175, at 25-26.
180. Convention, supra note 4, art. 137(3).
181. Article 137(3) raises another issue, one beyond the purview of this Note: whether
France, Italy, and the Netherlands-countries which also signed the Convention-acted in
accordance with international law in signing the Provisional Understanding, an agreement
under which parties may "claim, acquire, or exercise" rights with respect to Area minerals.
Id.
182. See Ratiner, supra note 88, at 1017.
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ing under the Provisional Understanding so unattractive that it will
probably require government support.
The need for government intervention, whether in the form of
subsidies or insurance, raises several difficult policy dilemmas, which
transcend the threshold ideological difficulties associated with so obvi-
ous a departure from laissez-faire doctrine.18 3 Most of these consider-
ations will arise in regard to the scope of the government's
involvement. First, as discussed above, the threat of on-site confronta-
tions or ICJ interference would in all likelihood drastically increase
the cost of the venture or possibly preclude private capital investment.
This would require the Provisional Understanding parties to seek gov-
ernment intervention and support.
Second, any confrontation or retaliatory measures by Convention
parties are likely to be aimed not only at seabed mining, but also at
other activities of organizations mining under the Provisional Under-
standing. The Provisional Understanding parties will be forced to
insure against losses resulting from blockades, sea-lane or strait inter-
ference, boycotts, or other economic sanctions against the non-seabed
activities and assets of companies and banks engaged in such seabed
mining.
Third, because of high costs, seabed mining projects are likely to
be pursued by consortia of mining concerns from several countries.
The United States and other Provisional Understanding parties would
thus have to insure mining projects financed substantially with foreign
capital. The United States would in effect be underwriting foreign
business operations.
The precendential effect of such government intervention may be
even more problematic for the United States and the other Provisional
Understanding parties. The effect may create pressure to subsidize
other risky undertakings. 18 4 It seems unlikely, however, that the
United States will insure or subsidize projects of this nature, particu-
larly those involving large amounts of foreign capital. Ironically, the
U.S. insistence on laissez-faire principles regarding deep seabed mining
led ultimately to an agreement under which massive governmental
protection of not only American but also foreign investments may be
unavoidable. The improbability of such protection effectively pre-
cludes the potential for United States commercial seabed mining under
the Provisional Understanding.18 5
183. See supra text accompanying note 170.
184. See Oxman, The Two Conferences, in LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 58, at 127, 142-
43.
185. [I]f a company in my District, like Lockheed, which has been one of the [sea-
bed mining] pioneers, came to me and said, "Can we afford to go forward under
the existing domestic legislation?", I would say, "You should not invest $1.5 bil-
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C. FUTURE PROSPECTS
By displaying an unwillingness to bind itself by significant multi-
lateral negotiations, the United States has alienated itself from much
of the world. Furthermore, the potential for seabed mining under the
Provisional Understanding is at best extremely limited. The opportu-
nity to sign the Convention has passed,186 and the United States may
now only accede to the Convention through approval of two-thirds of
the Senate.1 87 Beyond the historical difficulty of such passage,""'
accedence is a less appealing way for the United States to become a
party to the Convention, because by having so abruptly backed out at
the scheduled signature date, the United States has weakened its bar-
gaining position in future negotiations. Nevertheless, accedence is a
more favorable alternative than the result of the current U.S. inflexibil-
ity: an attenuated ability to protect its non-seabed ocean interests, a
tarnished image within much of the world community, and virtually
no opportunity for profitable and unimpeded seabed mining.
The possibility that exploitation of seabed resources may not be
feasible within the foreseeable future makes the U.S. rejection of the
Convention even more disappointing. Recent developments indicate
that seabed mining may have less potential profitability than was once
thought.18 9 Cheaper, less controversial land-based mining may be
expanded to meet production needs. Indeed, no U.S. mining company
lion, because you have no guarantee against risk. I don't think in our lifetime
you're going to see the Congress, particularly under the Reagan philosophy, move
to subsidize U.S. industry or to give a guarantee against risk or to send the U.S.
Navy out to protect a mining ship and two supply ships. It would seem to me that,
under the law of the high seas, while you might have the right to mine, you have no
right or no ability to protect yourself against others exercising their rights on the
high seas.
So I would come down on the side that, while the [Convention] might be flawed,
there is going to be no U.S. private investment or not U.S. Government action to
subsidize or protect such private investment that will permit U.S. private invest-
ment to go forward.
McCloskey, supra note 175, at 49, 54-55 (Mr. McCloskey was a Congressman from the
12th District of California, Delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference, and Ranking
Minority Member of the Merchant Marine & Fisheries Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives).
186. The Convention remained open for signature until December 9, 1984. Convention,
supra note 4, art. 305(2).
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
188. The most prominent recent example of such difficulty is the United Nations Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, which the U.S. Senate recently ratified nearly 37 years after
it was first submitted by President Truman. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
189. See, e.g., Goldwin, Common Sense v. "The Common Heritage," in LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note 58, at 59, 63-64 (citing the report of a Kennecott Consortium submission to
the Special Standing Committee of the House of Commons: "Whilst it cannot be denied
that the total content of the manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt in all the nodules in the
oceans may be vast, most of this resource will be uneconomic for many decades-possibly
centuries."); see also Drucker, The Changed World Economy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 768, 769-
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is currently considering full-scale commercial seabed mining.190 If
U.S. mining consortia decide not to pursue seabed mining, the U.S.
decision to reject the Convention will become that much more lamen-
table. The United States will have lost the Convention's important
benefits in navigation, environmental protection, and dispute resolu-
tion, 191 in return for ideological purity within an industry that may
never materialize.
United States' accession to the Convention would not only
improve its position with regard to non-seabed concerns, but also
would erect a universally accepted seabed mining regime, allowing the
orderly development of commercial seabed mining if mineral prices
recover and such mining becomes economically attractive. To pro-
mote seabed mining in the future, the United States should reconsider
its position on the Convention, negotiate acceptable changes with the
States Parties, 192 and accede to the Convention.
Such negotiations should prove difficult for the United States. 193
Their urgency will be inescapable, however, once U.S. policy-makers
realize that the Convention's non-seabed provisions and U.S. world
leadership are too important to sacrifice, and that the Provisional
Understanding regime will not foster seabed mining even if world eco-
nomic conditions make seabed mining commercially attractive.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Law of the Sea Convention offered the United States an
extraordinary opportunity. As a comprehensive treaty governing
essentially all aspects of ocean law, the Convention would confirm the
rights and responsibilities of all parties, and would lend stability to
maritime activities and world order. Given its position as a world
leader, the United States stood to benefit a great deal from this stabili-
zation of global policy. The U.S. decision to reject the Law of the Sea
Convention represents both missed opportunities and a diminution of
our position as an architect of multilateral conduct. Worse, the
United States has potentially alienated itself from much of the world
community; furthermore, by contemplating undertakings at odds with
the Convention, the United States risks damaging its image as a nation
committed to international legal order.
73 (1986) (noting low price levels and accelerating decreases in demand for metals and
mineral resources).
190. See Manheim, supra note 2, at 600.
191. See supra note 114.
192. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 312-314.
193. The last-minute decision by the United States not to sign the Convention may have
alienated representatives of the developing countries, who may now hesitate to negotiate
unless the U.S. is willing to accept a less advantageous regime than that of the Convention.
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The rejection of the Convention apparently was based primarily
on ideological, not practical, objections. The U.S. position reflects a
failure to comprehend the reality of global interdependence and an
unwillingness to fully appreciate the Convention's benefits. Ironically,
the result of this misplaced emphasis on ideological purity-the Provi-
sional Understanding-provides virtually no potential for commercial
deep seabed mining and will require concessions to free market princi-
ples that are at least as incompatible with U.S. economic philosophy as
any in the Convention.
In rejecting the Convention, the United States sacrificed valuable
opportunities in seabed mining and many other aspects of maritime
law. In return, the United States received increased isolation within
the world community, the probable loss of the Convention's numerous
favorable non-seabed provisions, and a seabed mining agreement that
invites international confrontation while offering extremely tenuous
mining prospects. Finally, even if mining under the Provisional
Understanding is ever undertaken, it will require a betrayal of laissez-
faire policies comparable to that in the Convention.
With all its shortcomings, the Provisional Understanding is
unlikely to establish a regime conducive to commercial seabed mining.
It is equally unlikely that the United States can persuade other poten-
tial seabed mining countries to believe otherwise. The inadequacies of
the Provisional Understanding demand that we renegotiate, amend,
and accede to the Convention. It is only under such a universally
sanctioned treaty that a United States enterprise will ever successfully
engage in deep seabed mining.
Steven J Molitor
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